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The obliteratiqn of previously distinct horizontal markets for 
agricultural commodtties has focused increasing atten-tion on vertical 
i 
coordination in co~odity subsectors. No accepted conceptual frame-
! 
. i 
work for· analyzing ~ertical market processes exists. A subset of 
I 
structure-conduct· v~riables relevant to v.ertical market organization 
and behavior is suggested. Testable hypotheses are generated. 
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i 
My purpose is ~o suggest some elements of what might. evolve into 
I . . 
an improved theoret~cal understanding o.f vertical behavior in market 
. I 
systems •. These iders have evolved from my search for· a conceptual 
framework within whkch the process of vertical coordination in agri-
. I 
cultural commodity ~ubsectors can be analyzed. That we are begging 
I 
such a framework i1 clear from ·much of the work that has been com-
pleted to date b~ ,embers of the verti~al coordination subcommitt.ee of 
NC-117, the .CommJ.t~eeon the Or.ganizatJ.on and Controlof the U.S. Food 
I I • 
Production and Dis,ribution System (see Marion, 1975 A, for example). 
There are several compelling reasons to develop an·improved 
theoretical expl~tion of vertical market behavior. Most theoretical 
. I 
attention to marke~ processes in the past ha~ been directed primarily 
to horizontal markJts~~ that is, ·the organization and behavior of com-
1 
peting sellers or ~uyers of_similar products. However, the increasing 
. I 
incidence of commo4 ownership of several vertically tangent processes, 
i 
various types of cqntractual arrangements, and other forms of vertical 
! 
int~gration in agricultural commodity subsectors has in many.cases 
.. obliterated previotly distinct horizontal markets. The demise of the 
live broiler market provides a well worn example. As the incidence of 
I . 
distinct ho~izonta} markets in agricultural subsectors declines, like-
. i 
wise the relevance! of a theory of horizontal. markets diminishes·. The 
! 
increasing concern! with vertical coordination is a manifestation of 
I 
I 
I 
I 
... , 
2 
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this phenomenon. 
If ~e q.re t:o effectively study and analyze contemporary market 
problems in a~iculurre, an emphasis on vertical coordination and 
behavior i~ mandatory. Such analysis requires some conceptual frame-: 
work, at least' to serve as a basis from which to generate a meaning,.. 
tully interrelated set ·of questions to answer, or hypotheses to .test. 
Furtherinore, such a conceptualframework enhances the probability that· 
the efforts of relatively autonomous market researchers will have some 
additive quality, at least in term8 of improving our collective under-
standing of veJ;t;i;caJ; market processes. 
As I present my conceptual framework I wan·t to lift up three 
·qQ.estioq.s: 1) Is the basic theoretical framework logically constructed 
and .intuitivelyapP,ea!ing? 2) Are the suggested parameters relevant 
to an improved expla;nation of vertical behavior in agricultural mar;.. 
kets? And 3) what additional parameters shouldbe added to ·provide a 
more comprehensive basis.forunderstanding and analyzing vertical 
market behavior,? • 
THE ESSENCE OF'THE CONCEPT 
Quite simply, and borrowing heavily fr.ommarket structure analysis, 
my thes.is is this: there exists a tractable set of functional inter-
relationships alliong elements of the vertical structure· of markets, 
various coordinating practices, and economic performatic;e. 
Obviously, the genesia for this thesis is the structure-conduct-
performance framework of industrial:organization theory~ However,mine 
3 
i 
is an attempt to su~stantially broaden that framework, to expand its.· 
i . 
scope to include veftical as we:ll as horizontal market phenomena.•, In 
I 
. I 
essence, .I am sugge~ting that.thereisa subset of structure and con.;.. 
duct variables. in mfrket.s that· has to do with vertical coordination 
I 
and other vertical ~rocesses, whereas the subset of structure. and con-
i 
I 
duct variables thatjhas received most attention by market economists 
1-
has had to. do prima*ily with horizontal market phenomena. 
These are 
some variables 
,. 
I 
not ~utually exclusive subsets of variables. However, I . . 
' I . . 
are '$ore relev~t to. vertical analysis than ·to horizon-
' I
tal analysis, and vfse versa. Furthe~ore, I suggest that the nature 
of the functional iJterrelationships among va~iabh:!s . in each subset 
is somewhat uniqu~. i That is, we should learn more about total njarket 
behavior by examini~g both subsets. rather than one •. ' Heretofore,· the 
vertical subset hasrre.ceived relatively little attention •. 
I 
I 
' 
Vertical Market-St~c~ur~ 
I 
I 
This thesi.s.is[predicated on the observation that markets have 
i . 
vertical structutesjin addition to the horizontal structures that 
have been of long t~rm interest to economists. The vertical structure 
ties together buyer~ and sellers in a market. This is not unlike what 
.. . j . . 
I' 
. I . 
those in the marketing discipline call a marketing channel. In fact, 
: ·. I . 
' ·. .-·: 
Baligh and Richartziequate the two [p. 1]. I think Baligh and Richartz 
are on the ri,ght tr4ck, _but a bit narrow_ in focus. A marketing· 
-• I , 
I . . .. . 
channel i.s generall~ considered to be ''the pipeline through which a 
. I 
1. 
product flows on it~ way to the consumer" [Clewett, 1961]. However; 
4 
in many cases there exists more than one channel, or parallel market 
channels, between buyers 'and sellers of a common product -- alternative 
routes that a product can take in moving from an original seller to an 
ultimate user. Handy and Padberg, .for example, have illustrated the 
existence of parallel systems, or channels, in the food manufacturing/ 
distribution/retailing complex. 
The vertical market structure can be viewed as the aggregate of 
all units or components that exist in all possible channels between 
sellers and buyers in a market. To help clarify this concept, a pic-
torial representation of the verti,cal structure to the feeder cattle 
market is presented in Figure I. While this may not include all rele-
vant units, and obviously includes elements of historic, current and 
perhaps future importance, it does illustrate that several .alternative 
channels can exist in a given vertical structure. Furthermore, it is. 
clear that there are considerable differences among alternatives, 
varying from those that are short and relatively simple to those that 
are long and complex, containing several intermediate units. 
This view of vertical market structure helps focus on some of the 
elements that may be relevant parts of the vertical subset of struc-
tural variables. Some such variables that appear to be relevant in~ 
elude: 
1. The absolute number of buyers 
2. The absolute number of sellers 
3. The number of parallel channels that exist in a market 
4. The number of intermediate units that exist in a market 
r--
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VERTICAL STRUCTURE OF THE FEEDER CATTLE MARKET 
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channel, or the length of the channel 
5. The perishability of the product 
1/ 
6. The number of stages that exist. in a commodity subsector 
This is not an exhaustive list of structural variables relevant 
to vertical market analysis. It is illustrative of the type of vari-
able that may lead to tractable interrelationships with conduct and 
performance. Following brief discussions of vertical conduct, price. 
and performance, I suggest some hypothetical relationships among these 
variables that are both logically appealing and, I believe, testable. 
Vertical Market Conduct 
Market conduct in the vertical cont.ext is a quite different con-
cept than in the more generally received horizontal view. Conduct, in 
the industrial organization sense, is the nature of the competitive 
activities among sellers or buyers. As such, these are the activities 
of competitors, or, as Arthur has stated, the activities of "all those 
who come into the market place with similar wares to offer. It (com-
petition) refers to a group, standing on one side of the market, each 
of whose members seeks to be choosen (original emphasis) by a prospec-
tive partner from the other side of the market at the expense of his 
fellows" [p. 7]. 
The subset of conduct variables that appears most relevant to 
vertical analysis focuses primarily on coordinating activities between 
buyers and sellers rather than on competing activities among buyers or 
sellers. Essentially, this is the process of trading options back and 
7 
forth between buyers and sellers until a mutually acceptable agree-
ment, or stalemate, :is reached. Arthur refers to this as bargaining, 
or the process of "~egotiating, comparing, making choices, and arriv-
ing at an agreement with a partner - a supplier or a customer - who 
himself has been negotiating, comparing and making choices" [p. 7]. 
I 
It is through this process that the competitive actiVities·of 
sellers are coordinated with the competitive activities of.buyers. 
This is the process .of coordinating vertical relationships ina mar-
]:_/ 
ket. Coordinating practices, therefore, appear to be ·important ele.,.... 
ments of the vertica,l subset of conduct variables. Certainly com-
petitive activities, such as coercion or discrimination, affect ver-
tical relationships, but I believe that the impact of such competitive 
practices is relatively well understood. The interrelationships be-
tween coordinating practices, market structure and performance are 
less clear. 
Marion has presented a seemingly viable array of coordinating 
practices generally evidenced in agricultural subsectors [1975 B]. 
These prescribe the framework within which most vertical market ac~ 
tivity is conducted, ranging from spot-transactions, ·or open produc-
tion in Marion's teJi'minology, through an array of increasingly spe-
cific contractual arrangements to vertical integration through com-
mon ownership, or, in Marion's terms, administrative production. 
It seems useful to arrange such practices on a continuum ordered 
by the degree to which the relationship between the buyer and seller 
is prespecified on a long term basis. Ranging from least to most 
8 
specific, these coordinating practices include: 
1. Spot transac;tions 
2. <:;ontract consumated after production decision 
a. Pric~ formula, .no product (quality and/or quantity) 
specifications 
b. Market contract with price formula and product 
specifications 
c. Market contract with product and price specifications 
3. Contract consumated prior to production decision 
a • .. ; Market .spec;:ificat,iotl contract 
b.· Production specification contract 
. ,. c. Resource providing contract 
d. Services contract 
4. Vertical integration through common ownership. 
In general, certain types of coordinating practices seem to be used 
in conjunction \Yith specific structt1ral elements, e.g., spot trans.actions 
. . ' ' . 
with local buying stations. and teleauct;i.o:ns. However, these. should 
not be viewed as firni relationships. Market contracts between local 
grain elevators (buying stations)· and farmers provide one example. 
Teleauction-type exchange of market contracts provide another. This 
.implies that both structural and behavioral variables are necessary 
to an understanding of the performance consequences of vertical pro-
cesses in markets. 
\ 
9 
Price 
In otir generall,y received theory,.price is delegated several 
critical functions. Primary among these is i·ts role as a rationing 
device -- the guide to resource allocation. This so dominates our 
thinking that we freq,~ently find "pricing efficiency" erroneously 
being used as synonYm-ous with allocative efficiency. However, price. 
is not essential; nor even necessary, for making allocative decisions. 
The second majol:'·function of price is score-keeping; deterinining the 
relative and absolute earnings of the various participants in the mar-
ket. That is, rewa:J:"ds to economic activity are divided among .parti~ · 
cipants through the.system of·prices. 
Prices exist.in almost any imaginable vertical·economic system • 
. Transfer prices in vertically integrated firms provide an example at .. 
the administrative extreme. But, the function of price is different 
among the various coordinating practices. At the "open" extreme, in 
spot transactions' .price performs both the primary allocative and 
score-keeping functions. However, as we move across the continuum 
toward increasingly.specific coordinating practices, allocative de-
cisions become increasingly administered and the allocative·role of 
price diminishes. At the administrative extreme, the score-keeping 
role of price appears to be much more important than its allocative 
function. 
Performance 
There is little difference in the concept of market performance 
10 
when viewed from either th~ vertical or horizontal perspective. This 
is generally comparable to economic performance that long shopping 
list of socially desirable ends to the economic process. In market 
analysis this normally encompasses technical efficiency, allocative 
1/ 
accuracy, progressiveness and equity, although it is not limited to 
these dimensions. 
Technical efficiency is a well-researched concept and I'll not 
elaborate it further, although I have discussed this and two other 
concepts, allocative accuracy and equity, more fully elsewhere 
(Henderson, 19(5]. .Allocative accuracy refers to the "goodness" of the 
\ 
match between what sellers want to or do sell and what. buyers want 
to or do buy. As such, this may be the singul,arly most important 
performance dimension associated with vertical coordination. This has 
both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Purcell's research in 
the beef subsector focuses attention on both of these dimensions, i.e. 
the coordination (or lack thereof). of the. quantity (through time) and 
the quality of c,attle moving betw.een various stages of the beef sub-
sector. 
The extent to which product quantity is misallocated may be re-
fleeted in the degree of S·tability or instability in the flow from one 
. l 
stage to the next over time. That is, the degree of quantitative al-
locative inaccuracy may be approximated by the variance in quantity 
flow over time from some measure of central tendency. With regard to 
the qualitative dimension, Purcell has used a "mirror image" approach 
using written and pictorial descriptions to compare quality rankingsof 
11 
buyers and sellers. Using that approach, the extent of qualitative 
allocative inaccuracy may be approximated by measuring the variance 
between quality rankings.of buyers and sellers. 
The other performance dimensions, progressiveness and equity', are 
more difficult to handle, both conceptually and .empirically. In gen...;. 
eral, progressiveness has to do with the rate at which new techniques 
and/or products are developed and/or adopted. Few, if any, workable 
~easures of. this have been developed, and I have none to offer. How-
ever, I suggest that the lack of relatively rapid adoption of product 
·and/or process innovations can stand as evidence o:J: the lack,of pro-
gressiveness. 
Equity is a complex concept, being generally concerned with both 
the level and. the distribution of wealth. and income. One aspect of 
this is equating a person's return for his economic activity with his 
·contribution to the economic process, or, in neoclassicalmargina:l 
economics, equating a person's wage rate with the marginal value of the 
' il 
product resulting from his labor. Hispayment is in terms of price. 
Under or over pricing his services results in excess profit$ .or losses 
to other participants in the market. Thus, the existence of excess 
profits or losses by some mark~t participants may stand as·partial 
evidence of inequity,. Clearly, this is not a comprehensive measure, 
but perhaps useable. 
THE USE OF THE CONCEPT 
I present the above as a basis for a viable conceptual framework 
12 
for analysis of vertical market phenomena. A number of seemingly 
testable hypotheses can be pried-from this framework. These include: 
H1 : As the absolute numher of buyers ·or sellers or both 
declines in two vertically tangent stages of a market, 
the types of coordinating practices used move away 
from spot-type transactions toward increasingly-specific 
agreements. 
Hz The greater the number of parallel channels that exist 
in a vertical market structure,\ the greater the array 
and range of coordinating practices used. 
H3 The greater the number of intermediate units that exist 
in a vertical channel (or the longer the channel), the_ 
greater the use of coordinating practices toward the spot 
transaction end ·of the range. 
H4 The greater the perishability of product, the greater-
the use of-coordinating practices toward the adminis-
trative, or highly specific agreement, end of the range. 
H5 The greater the number of intermediate units that-exist 
in a vertical channel, the greater the technical ineffi-
., ~ •' 
ciencies in that channel. ( 
H6 · The further that the coordinating practice moves away 
from the spot-type transaction and toward a highly 
specific agreement, the greater the technical efficiencies 
that result. 
13 
H7 The further that the coordinating practice moves away 
from the spot-type transaction, the greater the allocative 
accuracy in both quantitative and qualitative terms. 
H8 The further the coordinating practice moves toward the 
administrative, highly specific agreement, the slower the 
rate of ·change and adoption of new practices, .technol~gy 
and product forms by market participants. 
H9~,: The greater the array or range of coordinating practices.· 
that are evidenced in a market, the greater the range in 
-the degree to which equity obtains in that market. 
. . 
H10: The further that the coordinating pract.ices move away 
from ~he spot-type transaction, the smallet;' the variance 
in equity that obtains over time. 
Without much difficulty this list can he expanded. · By at:tempting 
such a list I believe that we gain some tentative answers to the three. 
questions posed at the beginning: 1) The basic conceptual framework 
appears to yield logically constructed hypothetical relationships ·rela-
tive to vertical behavior in markets. Such hypothetical relationships 
are intentively appealing, at least to. me. 2) The variables included 
seem to be relevant to the hypotheses gleaned from the conceptual 
framework. Many need greater refinement, both conceptually and ~ir""'. 
ically. 3) Many additional parameters need to be considered. Those 
put forth are, I believe, illustrative of the type of factor tltat 
leads to a tractable explanation of vertical market behavior. The list 
of hypothetical and . testable relationships can be expanded signifi- ·. 
14 
cantly as additional elements of vertical structure, coordinating 
practices and performance dimenf;ions a.re delineated. The challenge 
is to identifymore.meanihgful and.coni.prehensive factors. 
t·.:. .. 
FOOTNOTES 
Ohio State_University Economics and Sociology Series Paper No. 
522. An earlier draft of this paper was prepare<;! for the Subsector 
Task Forces of the Vertical Coordination subconttnittee of NC-117, 
Chicago, Illinois, May 12, 1975. I'm indebted for the reviews, ideas 
and helpful comments I received from Victor Nyanteng, ,Robert Jacobson, 
Donald Larson, Dean Baldwin, Richard Kilmer, Bruce Marion, arid .Jatl1es 
Shaffer. 
ll A stage within a subsector is a generally predominate grouping of 
funct:!ons into an enterprise or establishment. For. example, in 
the beef subsector, major stages would include. cow-calf units, 
growers, feed},ots, packers, and the like. Implied is a vertical 
market structure between each tangential stage in a subsector. 
J:f This is not to equate vertical conduct with cooper.ation. While 
cooperation between buyers and sellers-ma-y: exist, it may not. 
Clearly, conflict can and often does arise in the negotiations or 
bargaining between buyers and sellers. Perhaps, the highly con-
flictive situations might be equated with painful bargaining while 
the cooperative situation, gainful. 
1./ This is usually referred to asallocative efficiency, or the "ef-
ficiency" with which resources are allocated to their "best use". 
I find this to be a strange concept of efficiency --:- what appears 
to be of concern is the "goodness" of the uses to which resources. 
are allocated, or the accuracy with which resources are allocated 
irt order to satisfy ultimate demand. Thus, my use of the term 
· "allocative accuracy". 
!!_/ Some argue that this is simply a mea.sure of pricing efficiency• 
It may be, particularly if we defi11e pricing efficiency as the 
accuracy with which price reflects economic contribution. Such 
a definition is clearly consistent with my partial definition of 
equity. However, ·it is important ,to recognize that, while· pricing 
efficiency is often equated with allocative efficiency, they are 
not the same concepts, given this definition •. As I have argued 
in the text, allocative decisions can and frequently do occur based 
upon nonprice or administrative criteria rather than upon price 
per se. Payment to the participants, an equity consideration, is 
almost always a function of price. 
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